IT-to-OT attack paths
Correlate exposure, identity, and findings into ranked paths that bridge IT toward operational systems.
Map the paths from the internet to the plant floor
Trident inventories the cloud and connected systems behind your operations — then correlates exposure, identity reachability, and pentest findings into the toxic combinations that could chain from a public endpoint toward production systems and supplier data.
Connected estateRead-only model
IT environment
Public services
Corporate identity
Production edge
Plant gateway
Control services
Boundary crossing monitored1 choke point identified
How it works
From corporate identity to the plant floor
01
Connect read-only
Attach read-only roles. Trident inventories cloud and connected systems across sites.
02
Build the graph
Assets, identities, and links to plants and suppliers resolve into one queryable graph.
03
Correlate the paths
Exposure, identity, and findings collapse into ranked paths toward production.
04
Close the chain
Each path ships its single choke-point fix to the team that owns it.
Capabilities
From public endpoint to production system
Attack-path mapping and pentesting across a connected industrial estate — ranked by reach to the plant floor.
Inventory the connected estate
Map cloud assets, identities, and the systems that touch plants and suppliers, then explore blast radius.
Compliance, mapped to risk
Track SOC 2 and IEC-aligned posture against the same graph, each gap tied to a path.
Ranked by reach to production
Findings are prioritized by proximity to the systems that keep your lines running.
Supplier & portal pentests
Customer and supplier-facing apps and APIs are tested for auth, IDOR, and data leaks.
Fixes for the owning team
Each path ships its choke-point fix as a draft PR or copy-paste runbook — human-reviewed, never auto-applied.
Outcomes
Keep the line running
Focus on the few paths that could reach production — not a wall of standalone alerts.
IT + cloud
Connected context
Read-only
Cloud connection
Boundary-aware
Reachability review
Retested
After remediation
Scope
What is in scope, and what is deliberately not
Testing stops at the boundary. Control systems carry safety consequences that security testing must not create.
Where the IT and OT boundary is tested
Manufacturing risk concentrates at the boundary between corporate IT and operational technology. The plant network is usually described as isolated and is usually reachable — through a historian, a remote-access path for a vendor, a cloud analytics pipeline, or a jump host nobody has reviewed since installation. Trident maps and tests those IT-side routes without testing production control systems themselves.
- IT-to-OT reachability
- Which corporate identities, networks, and cloud workloads can reach the plant network or its gateways, including routes through shared services that were never intended as a bridge.
- Remote and vendor access
- Standing remote-access paths for equipment vendors and integrators, which frequently carry shared credentials and no expiry because they were provisioned during commissioning.
- Historian and telemetry pipelines
- Data flows out of the plant into cloud analytics, and whether the return path — updates, configuration, commands — is as constrained as the outbound one.
- Supplier and logistics integrations
- Partner-facing APIs and EDI surfaces handling order, inventory, and shipment data, where authorization is often inherited from a trusted-network assumption.
- Production data in the cloud
- Where designs, process parameters, and production records accumulate in cloud storage, and which identities can reach that intellectual property.
Frequently asked
Questions teams ask before they start
Do you test PLCs and control systems directly?
No. Testing covers IT, cloud, and application surfaces, including the paths that reach OT. Testing control systems directly carries safety and availability consequences and requires specialist arrangements, usually with the equipment vendor and during planned downtime.
Our plant network is air-gapped. Is this relevant?
Frequently more relevant, not less. Genuine air gaps are rare, and the value of the exercise is establishing whether the claimed isolation is real. Historians, remote support paths, update mechanisms, and cloud telemetry are the usual ways an assumed air gap turns out to be a documented one.
Can testing disrupt production?
Scope is enforced by allowlist, with rate limits, non-destructive payloads, and stop conditions, and OT ranges are excluded by default rather than by convention. Boundary testing establishes that a path exists; it does not need to traverse it into a live production environment.
How does this relate to IEC 62443?
IEC 62443 organizes industrial security around zones and conduits. This work tests whether the conduits into your zones are as constrained as the model claims, which supports that framework without constituting a certification against it.
See what could reach production.
Connect read-only roles and see the ranked paths across your connected estate through a read-only connection, without disrupting production systems.